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WHY DO FIRMS COLLECT DATA ON CUSTOMERS? A BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION APPROACH 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
This thesis discusses the collection of customer data and its potential use in 
price discrimination. I survey the current literature on behavior-based 
price discrimination to understand its implications to firms’ profitability. 
Focus is given to homogenous, non-durable good duopolies to investigate 
the competitive effects of customer recognition. As the objective is to un-
derstand why firms invest in the collection of customer data, welfare analy-
sis is left outside the scope of the thesis.  
The thesis also discusses two constraints that may have significant impact 
on the firms’ ability to discriminate. Firstly, customers’ view of fairness 
may provoke strong objection against behavior-based pricing. Secondly, 
the ability to anonymize or hide true identity creates arbitrage similar to 
second-hand markets. 
RESULTS 
Profitability of behavior-based price discrimination is strongly dependent 
on the assumptions of the models. With symmetric information about 
symmetric demands, firms are shown to be strictly worse off compared to 
uniform price regime. As both firms have unilateral incentive to implement 
behavior-based price discrimination, the model represents a classic prison-
er’s dilemma.  
 
However, less strict symmetry assumptions enable more diverse outcomes. 
This thesis discusses separately the importance of asymmetric demand and 
asymmetric information. The aforementioned appears to foster the ability 
to generate profitable discrimination, but results are ambiguous and leave 
still much to answer. The latter is the most recent field of research in be-
havior-based price discrimination. Again, the results are not conclusive and 
there is much to examine. I believe this direction to foster the most fruitful 
research in the coming years. 
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OSTOHISTORIAAN PERUSTUVA HINTADISKRIMINOINTI ASIAKASTIEDON 
KERÄÄMISEN PERUSTEENA 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET  
Tutkielma käsittelee asiakastiedon keräämistä ostohistoriaan perustuvan 
hintadiskriminoinnin näkökulmasta. Tutkielma on kirjallisuuskatsaus dis-
kriminoinnin kannattavuudesta yrityksille. Keskityn käsittelemään ho-
mogeenisiä, kertakulutushyödykkeitä tuottavia duopoleja asiakastiedon 
keräämisen kilpailullisten vaikutusten kuvaamiseksi. Tämän vuoksi 
vaikutukset kuluttajan ylijäämälle sekä kokonaishyvinvoinnille jäävät 
tutkielman rajauksen ulkopuolelle. 
 
Tutkielma käsittelee lisäksi kahta rajoitetta, jotka ovat potentiaalisesti 
merkittäviä tämän tyyppisen diskriminoinnin kannattavuudelle. En-
sinnäkin tarkastelen reiluuden ja oikeudenmukaisuuden kokemuksen 
merkitystä hinnoittelun hyväksyttävyydelle. Toisaalta asiakkaiden kyky 
kätkeytyä luo ostohistoriaan perustuvassa hintadiskriminoinnissa vastaa-
van arbitraasimahdollisuuden kuin jälkimarkkinoiden olemassaolo. 
 
TULOKSET  
Ostohistoriaperusteisen diskriminoinnin kannattavuus yrityksille riippuu 
ratkaisevasti mallien symmetriaoletuksista. Mikäli yrityksillä oletetaan 
olevan symmetristä tietoa kysynnän olessa symmetristä, lopputuloksena 
on klassinen vangin dilemma, jossa yksityisesti kumpikin yritys hyötyy 
asiakkaiden tunnistamisesta mutta yhdessä yritykset päätyvät epäopti-
maaliseen ratkaisuun. 
 
Lieventämällä symmetriavaatimuksia voidaan kuitenkin saavuttaa 
moninaisempia lopputuloksia, jolloin diskriminointi voi olla myös yhteis-
esti kannattavaa. Käsittelen erikseen sekä epäsymmetrisen informaation 
että epäsymmetrisen kysynnän merkitystä diskriminoinnin kannatta-
vuudelle. Kirjallisuus ei ole toistaiseksi saavuttanut yhteisymmärrystä lop-
putuloksista, joten tällä tutkimuksen saralla on yhä tarvetta 
lisätutkimukselle. Uskon että hedelmällisin tutkimus löytyy jatkossa er-
ityisesti epäsymmetrisen informaation alueelta. 
  
AVAINSANAT 
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1 Introduction 
Customer recognition is a hot topic in the retail sector at the moment and collec-
tion of customer data has become an increasingly common practice among com-
panies. The advances in information technology and the trend of customers be-
coming less anonymous to firms have opened up vast sets of available customer 
data. Not only is it currently technically possible to automatize pricing based on 
various attributes, starting from the time of the day to the clicks a customer 
makes online, but also customers are more and more willing to share their iden-
tities with companies. 
The vision for future shopping is rather striking. Take for example the latest 
Harvard Business Review (12/2011) report on retailing. HBR envisions practices 
such as automatic customer recognition at the entrance of the store; recommen-
dations in the fitting room based on customer’s purchases; and customized offers 
at the checkout to entice additional sales. According to HBR “using increasingly 
granular data, from detailed demographics and psychographics to consumers’ 
clickstreams on the web, businesses are starting to create highly customized of-
fers that steer customers to the “right” merchandise or services – at the right 
time, at the right price, and in the right channel.” 
The vision HBR paints is definitely not utopia. Customer recognition is already 
widely spread. Nearly 90% of the Finns own a loyalty card according to the 2011 
Eurobarometer on data protection and electronic identity. On top of this, many 
belong to social communities, such as Foursquares, that encourage people to re-
veal their identity and preferences to firms. In a recent case of botulism in 
canned olives, the Finnish data protection authorities gave the retail chain Kesko 
an exception to look up individual customers who had bought the product. This 
shows that the retailers already collect information about who bought and what. 
In other countries the use of customer data for target marketing is already busi-
ness as usual. For example, the Swedish retail chain Ica openly collects custom-
ers’ purchase histories and sends monthly, targeted coupons to each customer 
based on her past purchases.  
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As customers become increasingly aware of the data collection, this awareness 
may alter their behavior. According to the 2011 Eurobarometer, the EU citizens 
are increasingly worried about their purchase histories and behavior being 
tracked via loyalty and credit cards, both online and offline. Although there are 
significant differences between countries in the level of anxiety, clear result of 
the survey is that people want the authorities to control data collection and to 
protect privacy. This is also highly topical issue. Both the discovery of hidden 
tracking software Carrier IQ and the Wikileaks’ publication of Spy Files have 
raised concern about widespread data collection from consumers’ mobile 
phones and computers.  
Even disregarding the Orwellian feel of the situation, the exposures show that 
the worry citizens have for privacy is not unfounded. These revelations are cer-
tain to affect the way people view relations with firms in the future. They also 
raise pressure for the governments to protect privacy and monitor data acquisi-
tion. Interestingly, this may well serve both consumers and suppliers. If custom-
ers fear that their private information is used against them, they might be less 
inclined to buy which will harm the firms as well (Taylor 2004).  
At the same time other constraints have reduced in importance. Most significant-
ly it has become radically cheaper to collect and store data. The cost of storing 
one gigabyte of data is currently a mere tenth of what it was in 2005 and is ex-
pected to drop below one dollar by 2015 (IDC's Digital Universe Study 2011). 
The declining storage cost enables firms to collect data that was earlier unob-
tainable due to the high cost. That is to say, the data has always been there but it 
has not been affordable to collect until recently in larger scale.  
We are currently at a stage where there is an abundance of information in the 
market. Firms are capable of investing in data management systems to utilize the 
information and at the same time there is a growing concern from the public’s 
side about the use of this data. In this rapidly evolving situation, economists need 
to be able to evaluate how the availability of customer data affects markets. We 
also have to estimate who are the ones in need of protection and what is the effi-
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cient way to ensure that protection. Even if the vision HBR paints will not be ful-
filled to the full extent, this is clearly the direction retail is moving towards. 
Therefore, we need to be able to predict and evaluate the outcomes and welfare 
effects of the widespread use of customer data.  
Economists also have to be able to estimate the rationality of the investments the 
firms are making. No firm invests in customer data collection unless there is a 
profit to be gained from it. There are myriad reasons for firms to collect data. 
Knowing customers may assist in improving customer service or be utilized in 
product differentiation. Detailed customer data could also be sold to other firms 
as Spy Files claim or used for anticompetitive ends such as predatory pricing. 
Most importantly, firms may want to know more about individual customers in 
order to price discriminate. The last point is what Harvard Business Review, 
along with many economists, supports by saying that businesses need to “create 
highly customized offers -- at the right time, at the right price, and in the right 
channel.” This thesis seeks to understand how customer data affects firm’s abil-
ity to discriminate and what the implications of that discrimination to profitabil-
ity are. 
1.1 Behavior-based price discrimination 
Discrimination based on collected customer data about past purchases is called 
behavior-based price discrimination (Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2005). In its 
most simple form, the data is just the knowledge of whether a customer is new 
or recurring. If all the customers buy at every period, then all new customers 
must have bought from the rival in the previous period. This enables firms to 
separate customers to different segments; own and rival’s customers.  
Behavior-based price discrimination (abbreviated BBPD) enables firms to ac-
quire two kinds of additional profits compared to uniform pricing. Firstly, when 
a firm learns which customers prefer it tos rival, it can exploit this knowledge by 
setting a higher price to its own customers due to their higher preference. Thus, 
BBPD enables the firms to generate “extraction profits” by taking away part of 
the consumer surplus. Secondly, because the firm can separate own and rival’s 
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customers, it can set differing price on the rival’s market. Since the firm knows 
that the rival’s customers can be lured only with a lower price (due to their low-
er preference), firms gain “poaching profits” from stealing some of the rival’s 
customers with low introductory offers. These two additional profits make it 
always optimal for the firm to unilaterally discriminate based on the purchase 
history. 
Because behavior-based price discrimination is based on the firm’s ability to 
segment markets based on some visible attribute (here purchase history) and set 
different prices to different segments, BBPD is essentially a type of third degree 
discrimination. Gehrig and Stenbacka (2005) point out that perfect price dis-
crimination is actually the limit BBPD approaches as more and more data is ob-
tained about individual customers. For example an online store, instead of set-
ting up price schemes for just a couple of segments, can identify each individual 
customer at a time. The store can then set personalized prices depending on the 
information it has obtained by observing the customers’ behavior, thus ap-
proaching perfect discrimination. But since implementation of BBPD does not 
require perfect information, it is more practical to view it as third degree price 
discrimination.  
This thesis introduces the special case of perfect discrimination but otherwise 
considers behavior-based pricing as a type of third degree price discrimination. 
For a wider view on discrimination theory, Armstrong (2006) offers an excellent 
introduction to the recent advances in the field of price discrimination, including 
behavior-based price discrimination, while Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2005) 
conduct a comprehensive review on the literature on BBPD.  
Though the possibility to collect and analyze vast sets of customer data is fairly 
recent, discrimination based on customer information is not fully new to the 
firms. Especially industries where information about the customers is accrued 
automatically, as in subscription markets, discrimination based on that 
knowledge is typical. For example, mobile operators have long offered lower 
price to rival’s customers to induce them to switch. Similarly, in the U.S. Pepsi 
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and Coca-Cola have offered discount coupons for their own beverage printed on 
the back of the grocery store receipt for customers who bought the rival’s label 
(Shaffer and Zhang 2000). These two examples require very limited amount of 
information to generate discriminatory prices. As information increases, discrim-
ination can become more complex. Especially online markets offer excellent op-
portunities to track customer behavior in real-time and to utilize this infor-
mation in pricing. 
Probably the most famous example about online price discrimination is the web-
store Amazon’s dynamic pricing experiment in the beginning of the century. Am-
azon applied a scheme where the webstore quoted different DVD prices for dif-
ferent customers (e.g. Streitfeld 2000).  Although denying the discrimination, it 
seems that Amazon – which records just about everything the customer sees and 
does on its website – conditioned prices based on the information they had about 
each individual customer. Unfortunately for Amazon, the customers noticed that 
removing the cookie that identified them as old customers resulted in significant 
price cuts for the products. Due to fierce public objection, Amazon was forced to 
end the practice and refund the customers who had paid the higher prices.  
The more complex discrimination gets, the more important it is to understand 
the incentives and outcomes behind behavior-based discrimination. It also ap-
pears that customers are not toothless even when it comes to elaborate pricing 
schemes. The Amazon example is an excellent illustration of the behavioral con-
straints the firms may face with behavior-based price discrimination. When cus-
tomers have strong sense of fairness, the unified protest against unfair pricing 
may be severe enough to scare the firms off. Furthermore, the revelation of the 
pricing scheme was due to the customers’ ability to anonymize. By deleting cook-
ies from web browsers, the customers were able to hide their identity and reveal 
the price discrimination. Hence, it is important to also study these constraints 
under behavior-based discrimination. 
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1.2 Information 
Does it then matter what kind of data firms collect? Firms can obtain basically 
two kinds of information about customers: vertical and horizontal. Vertical in-
formation is based on the customers’ preferences for the good, e.g. about quality 
or quantity. For example, firms would like to recognize customers who prefer 
high quality from those who care mainly about price and would be therefore 
willing to buy low quality. Similarly, banks would like to separate the high-risk 
customers from the low-risk ones. Under vertical information firms react simi-
larly to the information; all banks want to set high interest rates to the high risk 
customers while offering low rates to the low risk types. Corts (1998) defines 
this as best-response symmetry.  
Horizontal information, on the other hand, differentiates firms from one another. 
It depicts the brand preference or loyalty the customer has for one, but not for 
the other firm. For example, customers may for some reason be willing to pay 
more for Coca-Cola than Pepsi although the contents of the products are essen-
tially the same. From the firm’s point of view, the situation is very different from 
the situation for vertical information. Now all firms want to treat customers dif-
ferently because they realize that the horizontal preference must be offset some-
how. The situation where one firm’s strong market is the other firm’s weak mar-
ket is called best-response asymmetry (Corts 1998). While one firm wishes to set 
high price for one group, the other firm’s optimal choice is to price low for the 
same group. 
Interestingly, in competitive setting vertical information loses its relevance if 
firms share symmetric information. According to Armstrong (2006), vertical in-
formation plays no role in pricing decisions among competitive firms. This is 
quite natural when one considers the content of the information. Because verti-
cal information deals with customers’ preferences towards the product, assum-
ing homogenous good means that this type of information cannot differentiate 
the firms. Customers buy from whichever firm offers the lowest price. If either 
firm were to know the true valuations of each customer it would not be able to 
exploit this information because it is still in the other firm’s best interest to un-
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dercut the higher price. Therefore only information that differentiates firms can 
be used for discrimination in competitive settings.  
The literature about behavior-based pricing therefore discusses horizontal in-
formation. This information can be either about brand preference, switching cost 
or loyalty. Note that the terms are interchangeable. On one hand, switching cost 
is a measure of brand preference because it represents resistance towards 
poaching (Shaffer and Zhang 2000). On the other hand, when a customer with 
high switching costs is resistant to poaching she is said to be loyal to the incum-
bent firm.  
It is, however, necessary to separate information about who is preferred and 
how much. In this thesis, brand preference is used to indicate binary preference 
relation: customer likes firm A more than firm B. This is consistent with the ter-
minology used in the early models of BBPD. Loyalty again represents to what 
extent customer prefers either firm. For a group of customers preferring firm A, 
some prefer it a lot while others just a bit more than they prefer the rival. The 
most difficult term to separate is that of switching cost. In order to point out the 
impact switching cost has on different models, it is first viewed from the same 
perspective as brand preference. From chapter three onwards switching cost is 
considered a synonym to loyalty. High switching cost is essentially loyalty be-
cause it induces the customer to tolerate larger price discrepancy between the 
firms. 
It also makes a difference whether the firms can obtain private information. If 
the firm’s customers differ in their horizontal preferences and the rival does not 
know this, the firm may be able to create higher extraction profits without being 
exposed to more targeted poaching. Thus, it is important to discuss information 
symmetry between the firms. This has a major impact on the outcomes of the 
different models. Information becomes asymmetric when only one of the firms is 
able to recognize customers, or if the purchase history reveals information about 
loyalty.  
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1.3 Research question and related topics 
Information and demand symmetries have significant effects for the outcomes 
under behavior-based price discrimination. To understand the implications of 
data collection I examine different models of BBPD and show that the outcomes 
differ due to the symmetry assumptions. I introduce first the model of Thisse and 
Vives to familiarize the concept of customer recognition under perfect discrimi-
nation. Thereafter I move on to behavior-based pricing and imperfect horizontal 
information. I discuss brand preferences following the footsteps of Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1999) and switching costs following Chen (1997). While the price 
paths are opposite in these two-period models, the outcomes are identical be-
cause both model symmetric information with symmetric demands. Though not 
explicitly underlined in the papers, the outcomes rely on best response asym-
metry. 
Moreover, to understand the relevance of information symmetry, I will extent 
the discussion to include asymmetric information. Under this discussion I point 
out the importance of firms’ ability to create horizontal differentiation. The more 
differentiated firms are in the customers’ eyes, the more profitable discrimina-
tion becomes. Under symmetric information more accurate segmentation inten-
sifies competition, but here it makes higher extraction profits possible. 
This thesis aims to explain why firms collect customer data and what the impli-
cations thereof are to the firms. I thus focus on the applicability of BBPD and sur-
vey the literature to see how the current research views the matter. The interest 
is in homogenous, non-durable goods duopolies under best response asymmetry. 
Restricting the analysis to this quite constrained area enables to explore the im-
plications in greater detail. Furthermore, there are many interesting industries 
that fall in to this category: for example subscription markets, like mobile ser-
vices, and much of the online markets. These industries share common features 
such as ease of customer recognition, homogeneity of products and relatively 
low switching costs that assure competitiveness in the markets. 
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Although behavior-based price discrimination has interesting but ambiguous 
impacts on consumer surplus and total welfare, I will only point out few robust 
outcomes and restrict the analysis otherwise to the effects for the firms. In addi-
tion, related topics that will not be covered include product innovation (use of 
customer information on product choices), anticompetitive effects and legal as-
pects. The latter-mentioned are of course important when considering privacy 
and the collection of customer data. However, as legal issues are exogenous to 
firms’ decision-making, they are not essential to discrimination as such. For lit-
erature about product innovation, see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and 
Zhang (2011). For an interesting overview of the topic of competitive effects, the 
Swedish Competition Authority’s report (2005) on price discrimination offers 
excellent reading.  
The thesis is constructed as follows: the second chapter discusses behavior-
based price discrimination under symmetric information and demand. The third 
chapter expands this discussion to include asymmetric demands. The fourth 
chapter then considers information asymmetry between the firms while the fifth 
discusses constraints that might bind firms that practice behavior-based pricing. 
The sixth chapter concludes the thesis. 
2 Symmetric information and demand 
In order to study any economic events, it is necessary to build simplified models. 
The simplest setting to consider is the one with most symmetry. Therefore this 
part examines behavior-based price discrimination under symmetric horizontal 
information and symmetric demand. Symmetric horizontal information in this 
context refers to the firms’ ability to recognize customers’ brand preferences 
towards the firms. Demand symmetry means that both firms face similar groups 
of customers, although customers themselves can differ in characteristics. 
To familiarize the mechanisms at play in behavior-based price discrimination, I 
first present what happens in a duopoly under perfect information. I first intro-
duce the model of perfect discrimination by Thisse and Vives (1988) following 
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the notation of Armstrong (2006). After understanding where BBPD stems from, 
I move on to models of imperfect information. This chapter summarizes the find-
ings in the literature about the situations where firms share imperfect infor-
mation about symmetric demands. 
2.1 Perfect discrimination 
The well-known Hotelling model from 1929 formulates two competing firms 
under horizontal differentiation. The firms produce homogenous goods and 
serve a market of uniformly distributed customers. Hotelling shows that assum-
ing that the firms can choose their locations on a street both firms would want to 
locate in the middle to obtain the largest possible market. Therefore, with no 
customer information, firms’ strategy is to minimize horizontal differentiation, in 
this case the distance between them. Thisse and Vives (1988) utilize this setting 
to investigate the implications of perfect information with ex-ante differentiated 
firms. 
Assume two firms, A and B, which are located at the opposite ends of a Hotelling 
line and a uniform distribution of customers. Each customer faces transportation 
cost from her location (denoted by x) to the firm’s location. This means that firm 
A has cost advantage for half of the customers and B for the other half. The pro-
duced good is non-durable and there are no second-hand markets (i.e. no arbi-
trage). Further, Thisse and Vives model geographical distances. Hence, the 
transportation cost is the larger the further away the customer is located from 
the seller. The transportation cost for a specific customer consists of both dis-
tance and a common cost parameter that represents the value of the distance 
(e.g. €/km). In other instances the transportation parameter can measure the 
choosiness of customers, i.e. how much weight is given to some characteristic. 
Furthermore, marginal cost is normalized to zero and assumed identical for both 
firms. Then, the consumer’s surplus for buying from firm A is 
uA = v − pA − tdA (1) 
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where v is the valuation for the good, pA  is the price for firm A, t is the parameter 
for transportation cost (i.e. how significant the distance is) and dA is the distance 
from firm A. Because locations are defined between [0,1], we can denote dA = x 
and dB = 1 − x. Thus the customer buys from A if 
pA + xt ≤ pB + (1 − x)t . (2) 
That is, the less costly transportation is (i.e. the closer to zero the value for pa-
rameter t becomes) the more indifferent customers become between the firms. 
For t = 0, customer disregards distance and buys from firm A if pA ≤ pB. Thisse 
and Vives restrict the prices to be always below the valuation to ensure each cus-
tomer buys from either firm. Now assuming that firms know where each cus-
tomer is located, they can set each customer an individual price in order to ex-
tract as much surplus as possible subject to (2). 
Thisse and Vives show that price discrimination is dominant strategy for both of 
the firms in this setting.  This follows from the price equation (2). The closer to 
zero the value for x is the larger the substitute’s cost becomes. Thus, it is in firm 
A’s best interest to set the highest price for those customers who are located 
nearest. The higher transportation cost from B ensures that B cannot compete 
against prices incrementally below the customer’s total cost of buying from B 
(price plus transportation cost). Under perfect information, Hotelling’s result of 
minimum differentiation breaks: when firms know all about their customers, 
they refrain from uniform pricing and maximal differentiation becomes optimal. 
Customers close to the median are offered the lowest prices because price com-
petition increases once total cost for either firm approaches the other. Less dif-
ferentiation forces firms to compete in prices. Thus the lowest price is offered to 
the customer with the highest transportation cost, while those with low trans-
portation cost face the highest prices. The price for each customer, depending on 
her location, is then 
pX = (1 − 2x)t   if x ≤ ½  (3) 
pX = (2x − 1)t   if x ≥ ½  
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Solving both firms’ best responses in the uniform price regime, the uniform price 
would optimally be equal to the transportation parameter t. Compared to the 
discriminatory prices, all customers are at least as well off under discrimination 
as they are under uniform pricing (customers at x=0 and x=1 are indifferent).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the price paths under discrimination and uniform pricing. On 
the vertical axis the graph depicts the distance of each customer to the substi-
tute. This is the measure of horizontal differentiation between the firms. Hori-
zontal axis represents the uniform distribution of customers on the Hotelling 
line, while the lines depict the optimal pricing from equation (3). The graph thus 
captures the negative effect of personalized pricing. Both firms would get ½t as 
profit per period under uniform pricing but only ¼t once they target prices 
based on distance. The outcome is efficient because all the consumers buy from 
the closest firm. However, due to the intensified competition, surplus simply 
shifts from the suppliers to the consumers. 
Though both firms are clearly better off under uniform pricing, discrimination is 
unilaterally dominant strategy for both. The situation is a classic prisoner’s di-
lemma, which cannot be undone without cooperation. Note that in this model the 
firms share symmetric horizontal information. Knowing everything about the 
market changes the way the firms react. The firms compete head on about each 
individual customer, not the market as a whole. This leads to the heavily intensi-
fied competition and to the prisoner’s dilemma outcome. To appreciate the ro-
bustness of this result, let us next turn to the realm of imperfect discrimination. 
Figure 1 
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2.2 Brand preference 
Being familiar with the results of symmetric information under perfect discrimi-
nation, we can move on to the models of behavior-based discrimination. It is 
worth reminding that the above-discussed model is the limit of behavior-based 
pricing. As information aggregates, firms are able to price as in Thisse and Vives. 
However, as perfect discrimination is, and probably will remain, an unfeasible 
concept, it is more interesting to discuss how imperfect information about cus-
tomers affects markets. From now on, firms can no longer discriminate individu-
ally, only on segment-basis. More precisely, in this section firms only obtain in-
formation about the brand preference. In other words, firm learns if the custom-
er likes it more than the rival. 
Furthermore, the model of Thisse and Vives is purely static, while majority of the 
models discussing behavior-based price discrimination are dynamic games. 
Basic setting is that in the beginning of the first period the firms know nothing 
about the customers, therefore setting uniform price. Learning happens during 
the first period purchasing so that in the beginning of the second period the 
firms can use that information in pricing.  
In this section, I introduce two simple models of BBPD under symmetric, hori-
zontal information. First is a two-period duopoly model with continuous prefer-
ences by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and the second is Chen and Zhang’s 
(2009) model with discrete types.  
2.2.1 Continuous preferences 
Let us first consider the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Again, two firms, 
A and B, are assumed identical in terms of costs and are situated on a Hotelling 
line. Customer preferences are assumed uniformly distributed along this line 
similar to Thisse and Vives. There is unit consumption per period, i.e. each cus-
tomer buys only from one firm at a time. The customers have inherent prefer-
ence over either of the firms with the median customer being indifferent. The 
preferences are denoted by θ ∈ [θA, θB] and assumed constant over time, while 
firms’ pricing is assumed to be below reservation prices to ensure unit demand 
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in each period. The parameter θ has the same interpretation as distance in 
Thisse and Vives, but unlike in their paper, firms cannot identify θ explicitly. 
Firms will only learn whether the customer has preference for them or not, not 
how strong of the preference is.  
Figure 2 depicts the situation under symmetric information about brand prefer-
ences. The presentation is slightly simplified compared to Fudenberg and Tirole. 
The first period uniform price is set equal to the second period price to own cus-
tomers whereas in Fudenberg and Tirole the firms have to lower also their se-
cond period prices to own customer. Therefore my illustration paints somewhat 
more optimistic view. But as will be shown soon, this does not affect the overall 
outcome for firms.  
Figure 2 
 
In the first period the firms do not know the customers and they must set uni-
form price P1 to all. After the first period purchasing is done, the firms learn the 
relative brand preferences of the customers. Purchase behavior in the first peri-
od reveals that the customers who bought from firm A, have θ closer to θA and 
correspondingly for firm B. Note that in this case the firms do not observe the 
lines depicting the degree of preference (analogous to the price lines in figure 1), 
they only know on which side of the Hotelling line the individual customers are. 
Because the firms now know that the customers who bought from the rival have 
lower preference for their product, the firms’ optimal strategy is to set a lower 
second period price to the rival’s customers in order to obtain poaching profits. 
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Firms can therefore separate two segments and set two different price schemes 
in the second period: P1 for the own customers and P2 for the rival’s customers.  
Areas 1, 2 and 3 represent A’s profits in the first period from setting the uniform 
price equal to P1 and serving half of the market. In the second period A main-
tains price P1 for its own customers while sets poaching price P2 to B’s market 
and wins over area 4 from B. However, since the firms are identical, also B will 
set poaching price P2 and thus gains the same profit from area 2. Note that A can 
only keep those first period customers whose preferences are above P2 and 
gains profit of area 1 from them. Thus A’s total profit in the second period is 
equal to 1+4 while it loses area 2 to B.  
But what then happens to area 3 in the second period? Similarly to perfect dis-
crimination, there are now more markets on which to compete. Therefore the 
customers who switch from A to B and vice versa get the good at a lower price. 
However, not all of area 3 is shifted to the consumers since part of it is lost due to 
inefficient switching. To illustrate the welfare loss, consider the marginal switch-
er; the last person to switch is just indifferent between staying at a higher price 
and switching for a lower price. That consumer gets the same utility regardless 
what he does, but the firm selling at the poaching price makes smaller profits 
due to poaching. 
As the above-illustrated figure is simplified for presentational reasons, it does 
not capture few interesting outcomes that Fudenberg and Tirole calculate in 
their article. First of all, prices are in fact higher in the first period than they 
would be under uniform pricing. Secondly, the second period price to own cus-
tomers is lower than the uniform price would be. The effects of poaching explain 
the latter result. A bigger price difference between A’s price to own customers 
and B’s poaching price for the same group would induce more customers to 
switch. In order to hang on to these customers, it is in A’s interest to minimize 
the price discrepancy by lowering price to own customers. Fudenberg and Tirole 
calculate that under uniform distribution of preferences the optimal price for 
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own customers in the second period is ⅔ and the optimal poaching price is ⅓. This 
will induce exactly one third of the customers to switch. 
The explanation for the higher first period prices is somewhat more complicated. 
Fudenberg and Tirole reason it as follows: assuming that the customers are far-
sighted, they realize in the first period that the rival firm will set a low poaching 
price for them in the second period. This has a strategic impact for the first peri-
od prices. The marginal customer is indifferent between buying today from A at 
the price P1 and buying tomorrow from B at the poaching price P2. This makes 
the marginal consumer less price sensitive in the first period. Armstrong (2006) 
complements that larger discrepancy between the first period price and the 
poaching price induces more customers to switch. As switching is beneficial for 
the consumers, they prefer large price difference to smaller one. Thus, customers 
welcome higher first period prices than they would under uniform pricing. This 
of course means that if customers are myopic, that is, they do not foresee their 
purchase today affecting the price tomorrow, the prices in the first period re-
main at the non-discriminatory level.  
Villas-Boas (1999), on the other hand, argues that prices are higher in the first 
period due to firms’ incentives, not the customers’. After all, the larger the firm’s 
market share is in the first period, the smaller its ”poaching market” in the se-
cond period becomes and thus the potential poaching profits are smaller. Corre-
spondingly, a firm with a small market share has a large pool of customers to 
poach, resulting in more aggressive poaching. Thus, the more the firm appreci-
ates poaching profits the less it cares about the first period market share. Firms 
compete less intensively and prices are higher in the first period than they would 
be under uniform pricing. In either case, the lower prices for the switching cus-
tomers in the second period increase the total consumer surplus compared to 
the uniform price regime.  
A relevant point to acknowledge in the brand preference models is that 
preferences are assumed to be known by the customers in the beginning of the 
first period. Whereas in spatial models, like that of Thisse and Vives, ex ante 
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preferences make sense, there is no reason why customer would like Coca-Cola 
over Pepsi before ever testing either product. Hence, these models ignore that 
the customer needs to test both products to learn her preference. This would 
definitely change the motives for poaching in a two-period model because some 
customers would switch just to test the other product. Alternatively, the 
situation depicted in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) or Villas-Boas (1999) could be 
obtained by investing in marketing in order to create ex ante preferences. In this 
case the cost of marketing would need to be taken into account and preference 
would no longer be costless for the firms.  
While the model of Thisse and Vives showed that welfare just shifts under price 
discrimination, in dynamic models this holds no longer. Fudenberg and Tirole 
conclude that BBPD is socially undesirable because the second period poaching 
causes inefficient switching. That is, while customers choose their most pre-
ferred firm in the first period, some of them switch to the firm they like less due 
to poaching. The increase in consumer utility does not equal to the loss in suppli-
er surplus and therefore behavior-based pricing creates a welfare loss.  
Further, note that the negative effect of behavior-based price discrimination 
arises solely from poaching. Firms are worse off not because they can segment 
customers, but because they have an incentive to lower prices for the opposite 
customer segments. Best-response asymmetry generates poaching, which is the 
harmful mechanism at play, not discrimination as such. Furthermore, because 
demands are symmetric, i.e. both firms face similar customers, poaching is 
equally profitable to both firms. The fact that prices need to be cut in all markets 
is what leads to worse outcomes in the models of full symmetry. With symmetric 
information, the rival can optimize its poaching price, which in turn forces the 
incumbent to also set lower price to its own customers to fight back poaching. 
Both extraction and poaching profits decrease under symmetric information. 
2.2.2 Discrete preferences 
Using slightly different approach, Chen and Zhang (2009) tackle the dynamic 
problem of discrete preferences. They assume three types of customers contrary 
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to uniform distribution. Customers are either loyal to A, loyal to B or indifferent. 
Demand is symmetric as in the previous models since A and B are assumed to 
have equal amount of loyal customers.  
Chen and Zhang find screening necessary for the firms to gain additional 
information about the customer types. In order to separate the loyal customers 
from the indifferent ones, the firms must set high enough prices in the first 
period to ensure that only the loyal customers buy from them. After all, if also the 
indifferent customers were to buy from the firm, no information with which to 
discriminate would be gained about the market. This drives both firms to set 
higher than uniform regime prices in the first period. The reduced price 
competition in turn makes both firms better off while reducing consumer 
surplus. The first period result is in line with the models of symmetric brand 
preferences by Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).  
However, while Villas-Boas and Fudenberg and Tirole excplicitly conclude that 
firms are worse off under BBPD due to the second period poaching, Chen and 
Zhang end up in the opposite conclusion. Notably, the model of Chen and Zhang 
assumes the loyal segment to be fully locked in, which ensures that also the next 
period profits remain at higher level than in uniform regime (Fudenberg and 
Villas-Boas 2005). That is to say, the poaching market is deminished because 
only one segment of the market can be poached, whereas in the previous models 
all customers could potentially be poached. As previously, because poaching is 
harmful to the firms, any action that reduces poaching benefits the firms. The 
extraction profits are also higher than in previous models due to the lock-in 
yielding profitable discrimination. The nature of Chen and Zhang’s model raises 
the question about whether high switching costs could lead to similar outcome.   
2.3 Switching cost 
Thus far the models have discussed cases where discrimination is enabled by 
inherent customer characteristic, such as location or brand preference. Another 
set of BBPD literature relying on the foundation of Thisse and Vives is that of 
switching costs. While previously the transportation cost of Thisse and Vives 
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received the interpretation of preference relation, in switching cost literature the 
customers are assumed ex ante indifferent between the firms. Transportation 
cost occurs only in the second period in the form of switching cost.  
Switching costs are any costs generated due to changing supplier. They can be 
monetary costs (e.g. exit fees), psychological cost (e.g. search or learning cost) or 
costs of losing either achieved benefits (e.g. loyalty discounts) or network gains, 
such as the knowledge of other users (e.g. leaving Facebook for Google+) (Varian 
2001). As earlier noted, switching cost is a measure of brand preference because 
it represents the resistance to poaching. Therefore switching cost has similar 
impact on firms’ optimal choices as brand preferences and figure 2 applies here 
as well. However, switching costs create different price dynamics, which will be 
discussed next. 
Chen (1997) was among the first to study the effects of switching costs in behav-
ior-based pricing. The model is essentially the same as the one of Fudenberg and 
Tirole (2000). The important difference is that the customers do not have inher-
ent preference to either of the firms in the first period. In the second period, 
however, customers are no longer indifferent because switching supplier would 
generate a cost. In the brand preference case the customer faces no costs due to 
switching. Similar to the brand preference models, switching costs are assumed 
uniformly distributed. That is, some customers have lower and some higher cost 
of switching but firms only know the expected switching cost.  
Because there is no brand preference for either firm, customers buy in the first 
period from the firm offering the lowest price. With symmetric firms this means 
that the two firms set equal prices and share the market 50-50. After the first 
period purchasing is done the existence of switching costs creates a partial lock-
in for the customers. Now customers only change supplier if the rival offers price 
lower than the incumbent’s price plus the switching cost.  
Once the firm recognizes its customers in the second period, it also knows that 
these customers endure larger price discrepancy due to the switching cost. On 
 24
the other hand, each firm knows that in order to lure the rival’s customers, the 
price must offset the switching cost. Hence, also here own customers are offered 
a higher price than the rival’s customers. Under uniform pricing, switching costs 
cause second period prices to be higher than the first period prices to all cus-
tomers. Thus, a market with switching costs faces the same best-response 
asymmetry as the model for brand preferences.  
Chen shows that the existence of exogenous switching costs leads to firms com-
peting intensively in the first period. Since larger customer base in the first peri-
od means more locked-in customers, the first period prices drop in fact below 
the marginal cost in Chen’s model. In addition, here the far-sightedness of the 
customers is irrelevant. Because the key driver for the first period prices is the 
lock-in effect and not the customers’ expectations, price path will be similar even 
if customer were myopic. Thus, while in the previous discussion about the pref-
erence-based models prices decrease over time, in the case of switching costs 
prices grow over time. The outcome remains the same: the ability to recognize 
customers makes the firms worse off. 
As the rival’s incentive to poach is a problem to firms, a possible escape route 
could be to lock all the customers in for the second period. This would mean im-
posing high enough switching cost to deter switching. One possible way to 
achieve this is to offer long-term contracts, as Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) sug-
gest. However, because firms forgo greater extraction profits when they force 
both low and high switching cost customers to the same contract type, Fuden-
berg and Tirole find that it is never optimal to offer only long-term contracts. 
Thus, a fraction of the market buys only short-term contract and poaching occurs 
in the second period.  
Offering long-term and short-term contracts is quite similar to Chen and Zhang’s 
(2009) model of discrete preferences. While both models incorporate captive 
customers and switchers in the second period, the models differ substantially in 
the first period dynamics. As already mentioned, in Chen and Zhang the first pe-
riod prices are high due to screening. In Fudenberg and Tirole, however, custom-
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ers are not inherently loyal. Thus, the results differ in the same manner as for the 
basic brand preference and switching cost models. In the aforementioned the 
first period price is higher, while in the latter it is lower than under uniform pric-
ing. Because the second period is identical in both models, differences in the first 
period results determine the overall profitability. 
There is also an important difference in the information content. Chen and Zhang 
assume the firms to know not only brand preferences, but also the degree of 
preference, i.e. how loyal the customers are. By setting high prices, the firms in 
fact search for the customers who are closest to them. This is additional infor-
mation compared to the other BBPD models discussed in this chapter. However, 
according to the results of Thisse and Vives (1988) firms should not be better off 
even with more detailed information. Hence, the difference must derive from the 
rather restrictive assumption of captive customers. While Thisse and Vives con-
sider all the customers to be potential switchers, in Chen and Zhang only one 
fraction of the market is willing to change supplier. This makes the model similar 
to the models of addressability (e.g. Esteves 2009) where some customers are 
unaware of the rival. When part of the customers is captive without this impos-
ing a cost to the firms, BBPD can become profitable.  
The results under full symmetry seem to be able to describe the features in sub-
scription markets rather well. The basic assumptions of homogenous good unit 
demand and full market coverage fit e.g. the mobile service sector well. For ex-
ample, in Finland mobile operators are at least in theory able to look up each 
phone number owner and see who subscribe to a rival. However, when more 
complex information about the customers is collected, the interaction between 
the customer and the firm grows in importance. The following chapters look in 
to less restrictive assumptions concerning symmetry and expand the infor-
mation firms are able to collect. This way, we can estimate the applicability of 
BBPD in more diverse markets featuring homogenous, non-durable goods. The 
next chapter starts by discussing asymmetric demand, whilst keeping infor-
mation symmetric between the firms.  
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3 Asymmetric demand 
The previous chapter discussed merely whether a customer has preference to A 
or B. The models of asymmetric demand, however, allow loyalty to vary across 
the customers or, alternatively, assume firms to differ in some characteristics. In 
other words, either some people are choosier than the others, or more custom-
ers prefer A than B. Demand asymmetry is a realistic assumption since firms typ-
ically differ in terms of their customer base. For example, it has been estimated 
that Amazon’s customers are more loyal than those of Barnes and Nobles 
(Goolsbee and Chevalier in Acquisti and Varian 2005). Thus, the demand for Am-
azon differs from the demand for Barnes and Noble. When customer bases are 
heterogeneous, firms’ demands are asymmetric. Furthermore, Armstrong (2006) 
hints that firms could benefit from discrimination based on loyalty.  Therefore 
this chapter examines whether firms facing differing demands could indeed ben-
eficially practice behavior-based price discrimination. 
3.1 Asymmetric loyalty 
Shaffer and Zhang (2000) consider asymmetric demand that derive from differ-
ing customer loyalties. They aim to explain why poaching is not a universal phe-
nomenon if results would be as robust as the early literature implies. Shaffer and 
Zhang point out that some firms find it optimal to give discounts to own custom-
ers instead of the rival’s customers. To understand when it is optimal to “pay to 
stay” or to “pay to switch”, they first assume that the market is already shared 
with some unequal division between the firms. There is no information collec-
tion period and the model is purely static. Shaffer and Zhang are interested in the 
relative loyalty of the customers. They define customers belonging to A’s market 
to have an average loyalty of lA and correspondingly lB for B. The differences in 
loyalty affect the pricing decisions because they represent differentiated cost of 
switching for the customer segments. In the terminology of Thisse and Vives, the 
segments have different transportation parameters (here loyalty) and customers 
are not uniformly distributed. 
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Shaffer and Zhang find that firms may in fact avoid intensified competition under 
certain loyalty profiles. The general outcome is that the firms should always set a 
low price to the customer segment with the highest cross-elasticity for the firm’s 
product. In other words, if the rival’s customers have higher price elasticity than 
own customers, the firm should pay to switch. On the other hand, if own custom-
ers were more elastic towards the firm’s product than the rival’s customers, the 
incumbent should to pay to stay. Hence, both firms will poach when the relative 
difference between the loyalties is low, as is the case with symmetric demand. 
When own customers are the more elastic group for one firm but not for the oth-
er, the first pays to stay while the other tries to poach the rival. Figures 3(a) and 
3(b) illustrate the situations.  
Figure 3(a)      Figure 3(b) 
  
Height of the box represents the average loyalty of each firm’s customer base. 
When A has highly loyal customers and larger market share, as in 3(a), B is 
forced to poach aggressively in order to generate poaching profits. This in turn 
intensifies the price competition in A’s market and A must respond to the poach-
ing by setting lower price to own customers. Firm A also finds it profitable to 
poach B’s market due to B’s customers’ the relatively low loyalty. Both firms fol-
low in this case the pay to stay strategy. The figure 3(a) pictures the same asym-
metric best response scenario as the earlier models with symmetric demands. 
In the case of 3(b), on the other hand, B is the firm with highly loyal customers. 
As B knows that all A’s customers prefer A to B but are not loyal, it is beneficial 
for B to poach A’s market. Note that knowing that its customers are easy to 
poach, A must respond aggressively to protect its market share. In this case, A 
sees it optimal to pay its customers to stay which drives the price in A’s market 
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down. B, on the other hand, is strictly better off due to behavior-based price dis-
crimination, because it can increase price in its own highly loyal market while 
gaining also some poaching profits from A’s market. Conversely, A must lower 
price both in its own market as well as in its poaching market. Here A pays to 
stay while B pays to switch. Shaffer and Zhang further show that there can be 
such a loyalty relation that both firms are better off under BBPD. When B’s cus-
tomers are significantly more loyal than A’s, B will find it optimal to concentrate 
in exploiting its own customers’ strong preference and neither has to lower the 
price for the own customers. 
Also Shin and Sudhir (2010) discuss the strategic choice of paying to switch or 
paying to stay. Contrary to Shaffer and Zhang, here firms choose different strate-
gies depending on the assumed preference stochasticity. Shin and Sudhir show 
that relaxing the assumption of fixed preferences may be sufficient to generate 
profitable behavior-based price discrimination. Previous models have assumed 
constant preferences, because allowing preferences to be random would make 
the customer data worthless. The fixed preferences are also one reason for the 
aggressive poaching in the earlier models. When customers have constant pref-
erences, firms know that only low introductory price can induce them to switch. 
Shin and Sudhir go about this by adding a stochastic shock term to consumers’ 
preferences. When the shock term is small, only the inframarginal consumers’ 
preferences change. As stochasticity grows (i.e. shock term increases) prefer-
ences change for a larger fraction of customers. Stochastic preferences seem a 
very realistic assumption since people seldom remain loyal to one firm forever. 
For example, industries with innovation are likely to encounter changing prefer-
ences. Nokia might not wish to offer low introductory offers for Samsung users 
since a new model might induce some Samsung customers to switch in any case.  
When preference stochasticity is low, i.e. preferences are constant, Shin and 
Sudhir conclude that firms pay to switch. On the other hand, when preferences 
are allowed to change between periods, the firms may choose the pay to stay 
strategy. The intuition is that when customers are more likely to start to prefer 
the rival, it is optimal for the incumbent to “poach” its own customers. This leads 
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to a mismatch in the second period as some customers stay with the less pre-
ferred incumbent because it offers a low enough price. The model of Shin and 
Sudhir and that of Shaffer and Zhang depict the same dynamics. High stochastici-
ty can be interpreted as the probability of having less loyal customers. When 
there is a high likelihood that on average the customers are not loyal, the firm 
chooses to provide discounts to its own customers. On the other hand, with low 
probability of indifferent customers it becomes profitable to poach rival. 
The interesting outcome in Shin and Sudhir’s article is that the firm’s incentive to 
offer really low poaching prices reduces as stochasticity increases. Since part of 
the second period customers will switch to the other firm even without a price 
cut both firms reduce poaching.  However, the effect of decreased price sensitivi-
ty in brand preference models, which enables the firms to price higher in the first 
period, decreases when stochasticity grows. In other words, once customers 
consider that they are likely to switch in the next period, higher price sensitivity 
in the first period forces firms to lower prices. For certain values of preference 
stochasticity, profits can however increase under BBPD even with symmetric 
information.  
Overall, the conclusion for consumer welfare is that when the smaller customer 
group is the most loyal one, it is also the one who loses most compared to uni-
form pricing. The larger group is better off if they are the least loyal but they can 
also be made worse off if the loyalty discrepancy is large enough. Apple and Mi-
crosoft operating systems show an illustrative example of this. Apple’s consum-
ers represent the case in figure 3(b), as Apple is typically considered to have high 
brand loyalty but small market share. Since Apple’s products are costlier than 
the rival’s products, it would seem that the Apple consumers end up paying for 
their loyalty. Microsoft, on the other hand, practices pay to stay strategy e.g. by 
offering lower upgrade prices to the existing customers (Shaffer and Zhang 
2000). In this case, Microsoft must rely on recognizing old customers. At least for 
now, it seems that Apple does not bother poaching Microsoft’s customers. If Ap-
ple’s average loyalty dilutes as its market share grows, the theory would predict 
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that Apple might also be induced to separate customers based on purchase his-
tory and apply poaching strategies. 
3.2 Asymmetric firms 
Althought the results of Shaffer and Zhang (2000) shed light on the firms’ 
strategic options under BBPD, the static nature of the model leaves an open 
question. Since the competition for the market share is not taken into account, 
the model might foster similar features as those with switching costs. In the 
dynamic models, the firms take the second period outcome into account in their 
first period decision-making. Customarily, in the BBPD models with switching 
costs, firms realize that the first period market share affects the outcome in the 
second period. Alternatively, the firms might differ in some characteristics which 
causes a larger fraction of the customers to prefer one firm to the other. This 
asymmetry in the firms characteristics can also have significant impact on the 
outcomes. 
Therefore, this section discusses dynamic models with asymmetric firms. Pazgal 
and Soberman (2008) assume in one specification of their model that the other 
firm has greater ability to add benefit to consumers in the second period. Since 
this benefit would be lost if the customer switches in the second period, it means 
that one firm is able to generate higher switching costs than the other. Hence, the 
firms are no longer assumed identical. Pazgal and Soberman find that sufficiently 
high discrepancy between the switching costs would induce the weaker firm (in 
terms of lock-in ability) to abandon price discrimination altogether. In this situa-
tion, it becomes natural that the firm practicing price discrimination profits from 
it. Behavior-based price discrimination is always beneficial when only one of the 
firms is able to implement it.  
Similarly, Chen (2008) concludes that substantial discrepancy between firms’ 
marginal costs may enable profitable discrimination. The mechanism for profita-
bility is the same as in Pazgal and Soberman with only one of the firms being able 
to price discriminate. Contrary to Pazgal and Soberman, the key driver here is 
the ability to conduct efficient predatory pricing. By addressing competitors’ cus-
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tomers with prices lower than the rival’s marginal cost, the stronger firm can 
force the weaker one to exit.  
Chen’s and Pazgal and Soberman’s models differ substantially from the other 
papers of BBPD since firms are not assumed to be identical. This also enables 
studying the anticompetitive effects of BBPD. These effects are important to un-
derstand since they can have a profound impact on markets. The discussion 
about the anticompetitive effects of behavior-based discrimination is, neverthe-
less, outside the scope of this thesis.  
An interesting feature in Chen’s paper is that discrimination is profitable because 
the discriminating firm becomes a monopoly. Chen does not, however, contem-
plate what happens after the stronger firm becomes a monopoly. Villas-Boas 
(2004) as well as Acquisti and Varian (2005) both conclude that monopoly is 
strictly worse off by being able to recognize customers compared to applying 
uniform pricing. They discover that customers’ strategic behavior creates similar 
problem as in durable-goods monopoly. That is, the monopoly can increase prof-
its only by lowering the price to attract a wider market. This in turn gives all the 
customers an incentive to wait for the lower next period prices. Furthermore, the 
customers are imposed to a ratchet effect; revealing one’s preferences in the first 
period makes them worse off in the future period as the information is used to 
discriminate them. The monopoly suffers because a part of the potential first 
period customers postpone their purchase in order to get the lower price in the 
second period.  
Acquisti and Varian (2005) conclude that price discrimination can be profitable 
for monopoly when customers have differing preferences. While in duopoly 
models the preferences vary between the firms, in monopoly they must differ 
with respect to some add-on services the monopoly offers to recurring custom-
ers. In other words, monopoly benefits only if some customers appreciate the 
add-on service more than the others and the service’s value depends on the in-
formation shared in the first period. Due to the increasing marginal benefit the 
monopoly is able to effectively attract customers into revealing their true identi-
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ties. The recommendation feature of many online stores is one example about an 
add-on service. The customer can receive recommendations only after having 
bought something and the more information one shares with the retailer the bet-
ter the recommendations become. 
Overall, it would be interesting to find more research about the effects of asym-
metric demands. Demand asymmetry is a very realistic starting point and full 
understanding of how it affects behavior-based discrimination would be useful. 
Both of the dynamic cases point to profitability stemming from the unilateral 
discrimination, while the static case of Shaffer and Zhang claims that both firms 
could benefit from BBPD. It would hence be beneficial to know whether or not 
the latter result derives from excluding the “first period” effects (i.e. the period of 
information gathering).  
4 Asymmetric information 
As pointed out in the second chapter, though being optimal choice for all firms, 
behavior-based price discrimination is often harmful under full symmetry. Since 
it was shown in the chapter three that discrimination can be profitable with suf-
ficiently asymmetric demand, it becomes interesting to next ask if altering also 
the other part of the symmetry has similar effects. Therefore, this chapter there-
fore discusses what happens when there is informational asymmetry, that is, the 
firms are able to obtain private information. Information asymmetry can arise 
due to two reasons; either the other firm is unable to gather information due to 
incomplete addressability (as in Esteves 2009) or the firms can gain additional 
information that is not visible to the rival about their own customers. In the 
afore-mentioned case, asymmetry is endogenously created in the model, while 
for the latter case asymmetry results from customer characteristics. 
Asymmetric information has not been examined as explicitly as symmetric in-
formation in the behavior-based price discrimination setting. Majority of the pa-
pers that find BBPD profitable do so due to asymmetric demand or sufficient 
lock-in. Thus, being able to segment the own customers to highly valuable and 
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less valuable groups benefits the discriminating firms. However, as Shy and 
Stenbacka (2011) point out, information asymmetry is essential if there are no 
captive customers. If firms had symmetric information about relative loyalties, 
the rival could just better target its poaching offers. After all, there would be 
more markets to compete head on and as the market segments increased the 
situation would resemble perfect discrimination. Thus, it may be that infor-
mation asymmetry can make discrimination profitable even in the situations 
where it was earlier found clearly harmful. 
4.1 Endogenous asymmetry 
Since behavior-based pricing is profitable when only one of the firms is able to 
practice it, the firms have a unilateral incentive to create asymmetry with re-
spect to horizontal information. This is in essence obtained when either of the 
firms serves the entire market in the first period, or alternatively, if one firm is 
not able to separate poaching market from its own customers due to limited ad-
dressability. In this section I will discuss the latter scenario. 
Esteves (2009) extents behavior-based price discrimination to the discussion of 
limited addressability. She views marketing as a way to inform customers about 
prices. Without advertisement from both firms customers cannot compare the 
prices and hence part of the consumers become captive. The rest of the custom-
ers get ads from both firms and become potential switchers. The model features 
neither switching costs nor brand preferences, so only the price affects the 
choice. This makes the reach of marketing decisive for firms. The firm whose 
price is the lowest gains all the customers that receive advertisement from that 
firm. The high price firm only gets those customers who do not receive the low 
price ads from the rival. Thus, the high price firm is able to separate own cus-
tomers and poaching market, while the low price firm only sees own customers. 
This creates information asymmetry.  
In addition to the pricing decision, the firms have to choose the reach of their 
marketing activities. Note that if both firms send ads to all customers, the situa-
tion reverts to a prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, both firms maximize marketing 
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coverage subject to not intensifying the competition for the shared customers 
too much. Both firms simultaneously try to achieve two conflicting aims: a large 
poaching market and a large extraction market. Just as in Villas-Boas (1999), 
when a firm has a large market share, it becomes less aggressive in its poaching 
market. This means that neither firm wants to cover the entire market since that 
would intensify price competition just as it does with larger poaching market in 
Villas-Boas (1999).  
Both firms benefit because behavior-based pricing increases prices in the first 
period, but also reduces competition in the second period. The latter enables the 
high price firm to reap poaching profits, while allowing also the low price firm to 
increase its uniform price to its large captive market. The larger the marketing 
coverage is for both firms, the more there is competition and switching in the 
second period. Esteves (2009) notes that depending on the cost of marketing, 
firms may advertise too much or too little compared to what is socially optimal. 
Though featuring endogenous information asymmetry, Esteves’ model is very 
similar to that of Chen and Zhang (2009) with symmetric information. In both 
papers the mechanism for profitable discrimination is screening. In addition, 
part of the market is assumed to be captive which reduces poaching significantly.  
This would imply that the profitability of BBPD in Esteves (2009) does not nec-
essarily derive from information asymmetry as it does from captivity and screen-
ing. The next section moves on to models where all customers are potential 
switchers but information asymmetry is exogenous. 
4.2 Exogenous asymmetry 
It was shown that perfect information about brand preference and loyalty leads 
to prisoner’s dilemma. However, consider firms learning brand preference col-
lectively but loyalty unilaterally. This chapter discusses the situation where firms 
are able to gain private information about loyalty while information about brand 
preferences is symmetric between the firms. 
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Shin and Sudhir (2010) study the effects of asymmetric horizontal information. 
Their model includes also discussion about preference stochasticity, but here 
preferences are assumed fixed. Shin and Sudhir’s model does, however, differ 
from the conventional BBPD models in one other aspect. They consider custom-
ers to differ not only in terms of horizontal preferences, but also vertically with 
respect to quantity demand. There are four customer segments; high demand 
group preferring A and B respectively and low demand segments similarly for A 
and B. Horizontal preference is assumed uniformly distributed, i.e., demands are 
symmetric. Thus, the possible benefit from BBPD cannot derive from large dis-
crepancies between the demands the firms face as in the previous chapter.  
Information about quantity is significantly different from the information about 
loyalty. High demand customers do not have higher “resistance” towards the 
other firms poaching than low demand customers. As already noted, duopolies 
cannot discriminate based on vertical information. To enable discrimination, 
firms have to generate switching costs to the high demand customers by offering 
them discounts. This way the high demand customers become loyal, while low 
demand types remain unaffected. This is also what firms typically do: offering 
loyalty discounts keeps the rivals away from the incumbent’s most profitable 
customers. The pay to stay strategy can hence also derive from the need to create 
horizontal differentiation between the firms. In this case, loyalty discounts are 
the cost of obtaining the ability to discriminate.  
Differences in the demand quantities and the following loyalty discounts consti-
tute a substantial problem for the poaching firm. When the low demand custom-
ers are the ones most likely to be poached, the rival faces a classic lemons prob-
lem. This is clear in a specification such as Shin and Sudhir’s where the least val-
uable customers in terms of demand quantity are the ones most prone to switch. 
The lemons problem is highly significant for the other BBPD models as well. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) point out that poaching may not be that lucrative in 
multiple period models because the ones who switch are the most likely to 
switch again in the next period. Hence the best customers, i.e., the loyal ones, 
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remain mainly unaffected by poaching and only the least valuable customers 
swap.  
The lemons feature is also the one that determines the outcome in Shin and 
Sudhir’s model. When difference between the high and low demand types is suf-
ficiently large, the rival realizes that it will disproportionally poach low demand 
customers. Thus, the rival becomes less aggressive in its poaching enabling both 
firms to set higher price for the low demand segments. Reducing competition in 
one segment while increasing extraction profits in the other makes both firms 
better off under BBPD. 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the situation in Shin and Sudhir (2010). The height of the box 
represents here customers’ switching cost. Note that A has no visibility to B’s 
customers apart from knowing their brand preference (i.e. half buy from the ri-
val in the case of uniform distribution). Conversely, A knows more about its own 
customers than in the models of pure brand preference information. Because B 
cannot segment A’s market to subgroups, it can only set one price there. Firm A, 
on the other hand, can set two prices depending on the customers’ demand 
quantities in the first period. This enables A to gain more extraction profits: in-
stead of getting just areas 2 and 3, it also gets area 1 from the high demand 
group. Contrary to Thisse and Vives, rival cannot set corresponding poaching 
prices, which reduces the size of the poaching market. As B will most likely just 
get the low demand types, it will not suppress the price that much. Firm A will 
react similarly in B’s market. Hence, both firms are able to set higher price for 
the low demand types without facing competition for their high demand types.  
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Naturally the firms have to set lower price to the high demand types to create the 
sufficient switching costs. Shin and Sudhir therefore restrict the high-types’ de-
mand to be sufficiently large to ensure that they are always more valuable than 
the low-types. Further, as already noted, the difference in the demanded quanti-
ties must be adequately high to make the switching costs worth creating for. Ad-
ditional requirement for profitable discrimination is that there is a large enough 
fraction of high demand customers. This feature is not discussed in Shin and 
Sudhir as uniform distribution is the primary assumption. However, considering 
the results in Shaffer and Zhang (2000), the size of the loyal market is likely to 
matter.  
Interestingly, another study with information asymmetry by Shy and Stenbacka 
(2011) runs into completely different outcome. They examine a situation where 
firms learn their customers’ loyalties in addition to recognizing whether a cus-
tomer purchased from the rival or not. Here loyalty is exogenous and does not 
have to be compensated for in the price. The model of Shy and Stenbacka is also 
static contrary to Shin and Sudhir (2010).  
In this setting, Shy and Stenbacka show that asymmetric information about loyal-
ties is clearly better for the firms than symmetric information. This is due to the 
same reason why Thisse and Vives find perfect discrimination harmful. Under 
asymmetric best-responses, as in Shy and Stenbacka (2011), symmetric infor-
mation brings no additional benefit because both want to approach different cus-
tomers with low prices. In addition, the more precise information actually makes 
them worse off because the rival also learns the optimal poaching prices. There 
are more markets in which to compete head-on, whereas under asymmetric 
segment recognition firms are able to increase extraction profits without the fear 
of competition. Thus, it is never optimal for a firm to share information under 
best response asymmetry.  
Further, more consumers switch compared to asymmetric information scenario, 
making information exchange also socially undesirable. Conversely to Shin and 
Sudhir’s results, Shy and Stenbacka find that uniform pricing is still the optimal 
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strategy and behavior-based pricing makes the firms worse off. Shy and Sten-
backa note the opposing results, but do not offer insight on where the difference 
might stem from. 
The model of Shy and Stenbacka differs in one respect substantially from the 
other papers. While most dynamic models assume the first period prices to be 
uniform and therefore the allocation of customers to be efficient, Shy and Sten-
backa assume the initial allocation to be inefficient. That is, they start with part 
of the customers being mismatched. Implicitly this result can be obtained if pref-
erences are not constant, firms apply random pricing (as in Esteves 2010) or 
addressability is not complete (as in Esteves 2009). The initial assumption of 
mismatch generates additional costs to the model that the other models do not 
consider. It would be interesting to examine the model without the mismatch 
cost and see how that affects the outcome. The mismatch loss affects probability 
of switching in the model, so this term definitely has an impact on the poaching 
prices and therefore on the profitability of BBPD. Further, the results could be 
compared with better accuracy to those of Shin and Sudhir (2010). 
Overall, the effects of information asymmetry should be granted more research. 
The models currently at hand offer encouraging but divergent results and re-
quire reinforcement. It seems that endogeneity of asymmetry is not such an im-
portant aspect, as similar outcomes can be obtained even with symmetric infor-
mation. However, the inclusion of endogenous switching costs would be valua-
ble. Shin and Sudhir (2010) achieve this endogeneity and thus form a model that 
takes into account how loyalty is created.  
5 Constraints on discrimination 
This far the discussion has been focusing on the firms’ incentives to discriminate, 
but there are also other aspects that affect the firms’ ability to implement dis-
crimination. The most severe constraint for discrimination in general is the ex-
istence of second-hand markets. A major problem for a firm discriminating on 
prices is that if there is a second hand market for the good, there will also be ar-
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bitrage. Customers who are able obtain the good at a low price benefit by selling 
it to the high valuation customers in the second-hand market.  
However, behavior-based price discrimination may also offer some protection 
against second-hand markets. Significantly, collecting data on customer’s pur-
chase can be used to ensure that the same customer also uses the product 
(Odlyzko 2003). For instance airlines’ yield management pricing is dependent on 
the ability to force the customer to identify herself at the time of the purchase, 
thus effectively destroying any second-hand markets. In other instances custom-
er recognition may not be as complete but even some degree of identification 
may restrict the formation of second-hand markets. Simply put, firms who want 
to discriminate based on customer behavior will need the data not only to esti-
mate the customer’s willingness to pay, but also to deter second-hand markets. 
There are, however, few constraints that are characteristic to behavior-based 
price discrimination. Firstly, the customers’ ability to hide or anonymize them-
selves makes discrimination less profitable for the firms due to arbitrage in the 
same manner as second-hand markets. Anonymization is especially prevalent in 
online environments. While firms are able to effortlessly recognize customers 
through cookies and IP-addresses, customers can equally effortlessly delete 
those cookies or use different IP-addresses to appear to be someone they are 
not. Secondly, customers’ moral objection to this type of discrimination may be 
strong enough to deter firms from ever implementing it. The best example is 
Amazon’s experiment on customer-based pricing of DVDs. The customers’ out-
rage forced Amazon to refund customers and withdraw from the experiment. 
This chapter takes a closer look into these two BBPD-specific constraints: fair-
ness and anonymization. 
5.1 Fairness 
Assuming that customers are not myopic, but instead realize that they face dif-
ferent prices depending on their choices today, it is good to discuss briefly the 
implications of psychology. As came evident in Amazon’s test-run on dynamic 
pricing, customers can find price discrimination offensive and rebel against any-
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one implementing it. Thus, I will point out few key issues about discrimination 
and fairness and how this may affect firms’ behavior. 
First of all, fairness is clearly a highly subjective term. Kahneman et al (1986) 
argue that people evaluate fairness in trade by benchmarking the features (such 
as terms of sale, time and seller of a specific transaction) against some reference 
transaction (such as a past purchase or transaction by some other customer). 
That is to say, people compare transactions against some benchmark from their 
own or friends’ experiences to estimate if the transaction at hand is according to 
norms.  
In some instances finding a valid reference transaction is not that straightfor-
ward. For example in the service sector it is often difficult to show that condi-
tions of trade were the same. Thus differing prices are easier to explain and ac-
cept. In general, when customers feel stripped of the possibility to affect prices 
they respond negatively to the transaction (Acquisti 2004). That is why people 
accept easily quantity or student discounts, but object price discrimination when 
they do not know why the price is different for them. 
According to the experiments of Haws and Bearden (2006) people find pricing 
unfair most often when the price differs from that for other consumers or when 
pricing changes within a short time period under similar conditions of trade. The 
survey of Kahneman et al (1986) confirms this inclination. Their survey asked 
about the fairness of a landlord raising the rent after hearing that the tenant got 
a job nearby the house and would thus be less willing to move out. Nine out of 
ten respondents found it unacceptable for landlord to use private information to 
reap higher rent. As this is precisely the context of BBPD, the studies would im-
ply that this type of pricing is inclined to face strong objection. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated in many experiments that people are 
actually willing to encounter costs just to punish unfair behavior. Take for exam-
ple the ultimatum game, an experiment where a player proposes how to divide 
the sum between two players while the second player either accepts or rejects 
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the offer. It has been repeatedly shown that people often decline positive offers if 
they find the allocation to be unfair. Kahneman et al (1986) introduce also an-
other study where students were given an alternative to share $10 evenly with a 
person who had in the previous round been fair in the Ultimatum game or share 
$12 evenly with a person who had been unfair. In this experiment as well people 
rather punished ”bad behavior” than gained an extra dollar. This type of behav-
ior is probably what Amazon feared and tried to remedy by refunding the angry 
customers. 
As price discrimination has the tendency to lead to Bertrand competition in ho-
mogenous good markets, the firms may even welcome the public outrage as 
means to avoid the harmful discrimination altogether. Odlyzko (2003) cites a 
U.S. railway case as a situation where both customers and firms were happy to 
ban price discrimination – although it reduced total welfare. In the beginning of 
the last century U.S. railway price discrimination was banned by law due to wide 
public objection of the pricing practices. Similarly, the firms that end up in pris-
oner’s dilemma due to the ability to recognize customers might wish for the gov-
ernment to prohibit discrimination. Unilateral withdrawal would make individu-
al firm worse off, but universal ban due to public opinion would benefit the firms 
jointly. 
These results overall deem bad prognosis for behavior-based pricing. Not only 
do people find behavior-based pricing unfair, they are also willing to punish un-
fair behavior even at a cost to themselves. However, what is considered unfair 
today need not be unfair tomorrow. When a certain practice becomes common, 
people start to view it as fair even though it was previously considered unjust 
(Kahneman et al 1986). This is because the benchmark transaction changes over 
time.  
A good example about this numbness effect is the yield management technique 
airlines use for pricing (Xia et al 2004). This type of dynamic pricing has become 
widely accepted and utilized in various transportation industries and was lately 
adopted in the Finnish railways as well. Especially noteworthy is that in the 1986 
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study by Kahneman et al, the respondents found it unfair to take advantage of 
peak demand. This is basically what yield management technique is all about. 
Although exploiting peak demand was considered unacceptable 25 years ago, 
today it is viewed to be business as usual in certain industries.  
5.2 Anonymization 
Another significant limitation for behavior-based price discrimination is anony-
mization. Anonymization refers to customers’ ability and incentives to hide their 
true identity. Anonymization is hence closely linked to privacy. When people are 
not able to hide their identity, they may be forced to give away private infor-
mation. Privacy as an economic phenomenon includes many aspects, ranging 
from the moral hazard of firms that under protect their databases against hack-
ing and data thefts to the optimal contract structure for the private information. 
This section focuses only on the aspects of anonymization and privacy that are 
closely related to behavior-based price discrimination. For introductions to the 
other themes, see e.g. Varian (1996), Odlyzko (2003) and Acquisti (2004). 
Anonymization is especially topical in electronic environments where firms are 
increasingly able to recognize customers with or without the customers’ explicit 
approval. For example, many online stores track customers’ clickstream, i.e. the 
items they view. Further, it is possible to see from which website the customer 
entered the online store, were it from Google search results or influential blog-
ger’s website. Firms are also able to recognize recurring customers based on 
cookies they add on the web-browser the customer uses. All this reveals poten-
tially valuable information about the consumer. A customer who visits the store 
from a blog might be less price sensitive than customer who googled the product. 
Or customer’s clickstream might indicate what the customer is interested in 
while frequent visitor exposes her loyalty. 
Recognition is not, however, confined to the online world. “Offline” recognition 
with loyalty card, ID-card or coupons is an equally common practice. The major 
difference is the ease of anonymization. Leaving a loyalty card in the wallet re-
quires less sophistication than removing cookies from web-browsers. As much of 
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the data collection in online stores is invisible to customers, anonymization is 
undoubtedly more difficult online than offline. However, online and offline are 
likely to blur if the multichannel retail envisioned in HBR’s article materializes. If 
customer’s mobile phone gives away the identity already at the entrance, it no 
longer matters whether the loyalty card stays in the wallet or not. This clearly 
creates new challenges for anonymization. 
Another interesting question is whether the customers have better ability to act 
strategically with respect to brand preferences or to loyalty? One could reasona-
bly argue that hiding brand preferences is easier. Pretending to be new customer 
is relatively simple in most of the markets. For example, the customer can re-
move cookies from the webpage or apply for a new loyalty card. Loyalty again 
means that the customer has higher cost of switching than some other custom-
ers. Because the switching cost is not assumed to be something the customers 
can choose, they have less chance of hiding their loyalty. When firms are able to 
find out who the high switching cost customers are, they can use this information 
to their advantage.  
Acquisti and Varian (2005) show that monopoly has always an incentive to make 
anonymization as difficult as possible to its customers. When the consumer can-
not pretend to be new, the monopoly is able to set a lower price for those cus-
tomers who did not buy in the previous period without having to cut the price 
effectively for everyone. Many of the papers on duopolies unfortunately do not 
discuss customers’ strategic behavior in much detail. Esteves (2009), however, 
notes that some of the captive customers for the high price firm may wish to for-
go purchase in the first period to appear as though they bought from the rival. 
Similarly some customers could choose to buy from the less preferred firm in the 
first period just to be identified as low valuation customer by their most pre-
ferred firm.  
The choice of whether to offer anonymization or not is not that straightforward 
though. Acquisti (2004) argues that a major problem with firms’ reluctance to 
offer anonymizing technologies is that customers who are wary about their iden-
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tity refrain from buying if they are not offered the tools to hide. It has been calcu-
lated that at the peak of the privacy scare in the late 1990s, the fear of identity 
thefts and credit card frauds caused billions of dollars’ worth lost sales (Acquisti 
2004). Privacy concerns are likely to increase again now that hidden tracking 
software, and such, have been found on eminent platforms like Apple and 
Google. Although on one hand the firms may have an incentive to restrict anon-
ymization, there is clearly both internal and external pressure to offer tools for 
anonymization. The fear of lost sales may be one reason why Amazon for in-
stance allows customers decide whether they want to provide the data about 
their purchases and clickstream.  
Taylor (2004) argues that strategic customers have an incentive to create disin-
formation when they expect firms to exchange customer data. For example, by 
postponing purchases customers can pretend to have low valuation for the good. 
This harms not only the firm collecting data via lost sales, but also destroys the 
validity of the data collected.  
An interesting addition to the problematic of anonymization comes from the sit-
uations where it is socially optimal to allow the firms to exchange information. 
Under best-response symmetry firms benefit from information exchange (Arm-
strong 2005). When customers have no possibility to anonymize, the loss gener-
ated from the customers’ strategic behavior disappears and the firms may prof-
itably share information. An applicable example would be the banking sector. All 
banks wish to apply higher prices (e.g. interest rate) to the high-risk customers 
and vice versa for the low-risk customers. In other words, there is clear best-
response symmetry. Furthermore, all customers must by law identify themselves 
when visiting banks, eliminating straightforward anonymization. In this setting it 
becomes profitable for all banks to share information about the customer’s 
trustworthiness (Pagano and Jappelli 1993). Hence, only in the case of symmet-
ric best responses and myopic customers would firms be able to benefit from 
sharing customer data. In situations where better coordination removes serious 
adverse selection problems, anonymization may prove socially harmful.  
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In sum, anonymization has both negative and positive impact on firms. On one 
hand it makes discrimination more difficult, but on the other hand not offering 
the opportunity to hide may cause lost sales. Anonymization has also ambiguous 
welfare effects depending on whether information exchange between firms is 
socially desirable or not. Although the demand for anonymization technologies is 
currently feeble, I would argue that recent information thefts (e.g. from the gam-
ing service Steam) and exposures by Wikileaks are likely to increase interest to-
wards them. 
6 Conclusions 
Price discrimination based on customer identification is perhaps easier than ev-
er. Not only is it currently technically possible to automatize pricing based on 
various attributes but also customers are more and more willing to share their 
identities with companies via mobile applications, loyalty cards or online identi-
fication. As firms already collect behavioral information about customers, it is 
crucial that economists can evaluate the effects this information has on market 
dynamics. Furthermore, as customers become increasingly aware of the data 
collection and its implications, this awareness may alter their behavior with sub-
stantial impact on the firms’ incentives. With the recent scandals concerning col-
lected customer data, people are likely to become more wary with their private 
information. 
The research thus far indicates that behavior-based price discrimination is a 
double-edged sword; on one hand it enables extraction of consumer surplus, but 
on the other hand the incentive to gain poaching profits brings along intensified 
competition. The profitability of behavior-based pricing depends thus on the 
balance of these profits. If firms can gain enough extraction profits to offset the 
negative effect of increased competition for poaching profits, they can benefit 
from behavior-based price discrimination.  
This far the literature has not been able to show that both firms could discrimi-
nate profitably when firms share symmetric information about symmetric brand 
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preferences or switching costs – except for the special cases of captive customers 
and stochastic brand preferences. However, relaxing either of the rather strong 
symmetry assumptions has been shown to make profitable discrimination pos-
sible. As symmetry restrictions are relaxed, the incentives for focusing on extrac-
tion and poaching profits change. Under symmetry, both firms benefit by unilat-
erally pursuing poaching profits. Once demand becomes asymmetric, firms may 
wish to focus primarily on the extraction profits. More subtle information also 
enables separating the loyal customers from the indifferent ones, thus offering 
the firms access to asymmetric information. It seems that when firms can obtain 
asymmetric information, they can escape the prisoner’s dilemma that symmetric 
information and demand bring along. Hence, improved customer recognition 
seems to be valuable both in increasing extraction profits as well as in reducing 
rival’s poaching profits.  
Behavior-based price discrimination is, however, severely affected by few con-
straints. The notion of fairness plays bigger role in behavior-based pricing than it 
does in many other types of discrimination. People generally appear to object 
pricing if their price is different from that of the other customers’ without an ob-
vious reason or if the seller exploits consumer’s personal information to her own 
advantage. There are, nevertheless, differences in how strongly people react to 
behavior-based pricing. Most consumers do not object introductory offers to 
new customers, so the very basic discrimination based on brand preference 
seems widely accepted. In contrast, the attempts of online stores to apply more 
sophisticated pricing schemes have failed notoriously.  
Another significant obstacle for efficient behavior-based discrimination is anon-
ymization. If customers are able to hide their true identities, they can repeatedly 
benefit from introductory offers or prevent the exploitation of their purchase 
histories. Anonymization is a major threat for firms that would like to discrimi-
nate based on the collected customer information. Although firms would prefer 
not to allow customers to hide their identities, they should offer some anony-
mization. Firms face a trade-off between efficient discrimination and the lost 
sales to privacy-sensitive customers. At the moment the technologies for anony-
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mization are not very sophisticated but the exposures of unauthorized tracking 
and the general awareness of how the information can be used are likely to in-
crease the demand for such technologies. 
Behavior-based pricing has not only ambiguous effect on the firms’ profits but 
also on welfare. The more intense the competition for switchers becomes, the 
larger is the consumer surplus. The customers with smallest switching costs are 
the ones who benefit most. But with more switching also the welfare loss associ-
ated with inefficient switching grows. However, if lower prices in poaching mar-
ket are able to increase demand, behavior-based pricing can be beneficial for the 
economy. In addition, switching does not need to be inefficient if preferences are 
allowed to change in time. 
Although it might be socially desirable to restrict behavior-based pricing at least 
in some instances, I would argue that a ban on discrimination is not feasible. 
Firms cannot be prohibited from changing prices and especially in the online 
markets prices can change within seconds even without discrimination. It would 
be impossible to show that price change had been caused by discrimination and 
not e.g. due to stock-level changes. Even if product prices were held constant, 
nothing would prevent firms from discriminating instead on delivery fees. 
Therefore the question is not that much whether firms must price uniformly by 
law but whether they find it profitable to discriminate. 
6.1 Future research 
In my opinion, an important issue that the literature should decide upon is the 
exact definition of behavior-based price discrimination. Thus far the literature 
has concentrated mostly on discrimination between own and rival’s customers. 
Only the most recent papers consider additional information about customers to 
affect the firms’ decisions. In reality, firms have a strong incentive to learn to 
know specifically their own customers in terms of loyalty or product prefer-
ences. In online markets and much of the other retail of non-durable goods, 
firms’ main interest is to learn to know the customer. For instance, Amazon col-
lects purchase data in order to recommend new products, while grocery stores 
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aim to recognize their most valuable customers. Obviously, in both cases the 
firms try to understand their customers to extract more profits out of them. 
If we consider behavior-based price discrimination to include on any infor-
mation about purchase histories, the traditional theory of third degree price dis-
crimination should be brought forward more explicitly. Once firms can discrimi-
nate among own customers without the rival recognizing the different customer 
segments, situation reminisces much that of a monopoly. Similarly to monopoly, 
there would be private information about the customer segments that only one 
firm can exploit. It would also be interesting to see how firm’s poaching decision 
is affected when the firm knows its own customers, but knows nothing about the 
distribution and qualities of the rival’s customers.  
In my view, the most promising venue for future research lies in the area of in-
formation asymmetries. It has been quite extensively shown that symmetric in-
formation has the ability to intensify competition, making the firms worse off 
compared to uniform pricing. Asymmetric information about qualities that dif-
ferentiate own customers seems valuable instead. Features that differentiate 
customers are also potential sources of differentiation between the firms. By en-
hancing loyalty, the firms effectively create higher switching costs for the cus-
tomers. This in turn enables efficient discrimination and profit extraction. A cus-
tomer who has just reached the platinum level for her loyalty card is significantly 
less likely to switch to the rival even if the incumbent’s prices are slightly higher. 
The studies reviewed in this thesis confirm the value of loyalty. However, what 
most of the models neglect is that loyalty must be created and sustained. As in 
Shin and Sudhir’s model, firms need to compensate the most valuable customers 
to keep them loyal. The firms also need to recognize the consumers in order to 
compensate the right customers in the right way. Hence there is a clear tradeoff 
between boosting loyalty and extracting profits that the simple models do not 
take into account.  
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In my opinion, to fully grasp why firms collect data on customers and how they 
can use it, the literature needs to treat loyalty as an endogenous variable, not as 
an inherent characteristic of a certain type of customer. That is, customer data 
matters because it reveals also something about the customers’ vertical prefer-
ences, not just about horizontal preferences. The firms can use information 
about the vertical preferences in deciding how strong a horizontal preference 
they want to create for each customer. For example, Acquisti and Varian (2005) 
show that differing vertical preference for an add-on service, such as recommen-
dations, is pivotal for successful discrimination. Similarly, grocery stores reward 
the customers with the most expensive purchases to keep their cash flow out of 
the rival’s reach, while ignoring the customers who buy equally from both firms. 
Although neither monopoly nor duopoly is able to discriminate directly based on 
vertical customer information, the data enables the firms to segment customers. 
By creating differing switching costs for the different groups the firms may prof-
itably discriminate among them.  
Overall, the effects of collecting customer data are increasingly important in eco-
nomics as well. Economists should be able to evaluate the implications of cus-
tomer data acquisition with reasonable confidence. We need to be able to assess 
why some firms might want to discriminate based on customer behavior while 
others do not. By recognizing the winners and the losers, we may argue who are 
the ones in the need of protection. The market is predicted to become more elec-
tronic both in terms of pricing and customer recognition. The visions of custom-
ized offers “at the right time, at the right price, and in the right channel” trumpet 
for better ability to recognize and price discriminate customers. The progress is 
likely to accelerate once brick-and-mortar stores start to compete more inten-
sively against online stores with constraints like fairness and anonymization af-
fecting the situation. Current research in the field provides some tools to grasp 
the problematic, but there is still much to work left to reach consensus. I fully 
agree with the authors of behavior-based price discrimination literature that this 
is a fruitful area of economics for future research. 
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